Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School by Pearce, Russell G.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1998
Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most
Important Subject in Law School
Russell Pearce
Fordham University School of Law, rpearce@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Russell Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 Loy. U. 719 (1998)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/781
Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most
Important Subject in Law School
Russell G. Pearce*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his essay Taking Rights Seriously,' Ronald Dworkin observes
that "the Government will not re-establish respect for law without
giving the law some claim to respect."2 To paraphrase Dworkin, the
legal profession will not re-establish respect for lawyers without
giving lawyers some claim to respect.
Re-establishing respect for lawyers is a task of Herculean3
proportions. Recent polls indicate that society's respect for lawyers
has dropped precipitously during the past twenty years, far more than
society's respect for comparable occupations.4 Indeed, for at least the
last ten years, this drop has continued despite lawyers' zealous efforts
to promote professionalism in response to the recommendations of the
1986 report of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Commission on
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This article was
originally written for presentation to the faculty of Loyola University Chicago School
of Law during my visit to present the 1997 Baker & McKenzie Lecture in Legal Ethics.
For their comments, the author would like to thank those faculty who attended
presentations of the essay at Hofstra University, Loyola University Chicago, Fordham
University Schools of Law, University of Haifa and University of Tel Aviv. The author
would also like to thank Sherman Cohn, Mary Daly, Deborah Denno, Tom Geraghty,
Steve Gillers, Bruce Green, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Milton Handler, Harry Haynsworth,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Carlin Meyer, Tom Morgan, Ronald Rotunda, Tom Shaffer,
Jerome Shestack, Ellen Yaroshevsky, Fred Zacharias, and Ben Zipursky for their helpful
suggestions.
1. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977). See generally Maura
Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics,
80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 926-953 (1995) (applying Dworkin's analysis to legal ethics
jurisprudence).
2. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 205.
3. See id. at 105-06 (discussing Hercules as "a lawyer [and judge] of superhuman skill,
learning, patience and acumen").
4. Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A6 (citing,
among other statistics, that the percentage of the public viewing law as an occupation
"of very great prestige" dropped from 36% in 1977 to 17% in 1997); see also Gary A.
Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1993, at 60, 62 (finding that only 22% of the public views lawyers as "honest and
ethical").
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Professionalism. 5
One of the many reasons 6 for the failure of the professionalism
crusade is the refusal of the legal profession's institutions to match
professionalism's lofty rhetoric 7 with forceful actions. One such
institution is legal academia. Despite lip service given to the
importance of legal ethics, 8 most law schools (with a few notable
exceptions) fail to give legal ethics the same respect and attention given
to most other courses, let alone a central role in the curriculum. 9
This Article addresses the importance of ethics instruction in legal
academia. It argues that the persistent disregard for teaching legal
ethics is grounded in three outdated ideological perspectives: (1)
professional and pedagogical practices ensure that lawyers are ethical;
(2) legal academia is a scientific project in which ethics is irrelevant;
and (3) adult moral development is relatively static.' ° This Article
urges that law schools teach legal ethics seriously by requiring a three-
credit first year, first semester course, at least one advanced upper-
5. ABA Comm. on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for
the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism 12-13 (1986). For a discussion of the ABA's
continuing efforts, see PROMOTING PROFESSIONALISM: ABA PROGRAMS, PLANS, AND
STRATEGIES (1998).
6. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995) (explaining how professional ideology offers little
moral authority to lawyers and the public).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. The term "legal ethics" as it is used refers to ethics rules, bar opinions, the vast
body of case law relevant to the conduct of lawyers and "the role of lawyers in our
society," as well as development of students' "capacity for reflective judgment." See
REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE OF THE ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM (1996)
[hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM]. Following common usage, the
terms "ethics," "values," and "morals" are used interchangeably. See THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 665 (2d ed. 1987) (defining ethics to
include "moral principles," as well as "values relating to human conduct"). However,
many lawyers and law students limit consideration of ethics to the professional codes
which they consider separate from morality. See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Thinking Like
A Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 511, 535-38 (1996) (describing and
criticizing the tendency of lawyers to cabin the concepts of professional ethics and
morality). This cabining of ethics can be attributed to the perspectives discussed infra
Part II.
9. See infra Part I.B. Related to the disdain for legal ethics is the disdain for
teaching lawyering skills. See infra Part II.B and text accompanying notes 20-21. For a
discussion of legal academics' attitude toward law practice, see Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 34 (1992) and Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalism of Legal Teaching and
Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993), which replies to the Edwards' article.
10. See infra Part III.
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class course, and pervasive teaching of ethics in all classes."
II. THE BETRAYAL OF PROFESSIONAL RHETORIC: PROFESSIONAL
COMMITMENT AND ACADEMIC DISDAIN
A. A Rhetoric of Ethical Commitment
A fundamental commitment to high ethical standards pervades
professional rhetoric."2 Legal ethics codes exhort lawyers "to maintain
the highest degree of ethical conduct"' 3 and declare that the "future of
the republic" and the "maintenance of justice" depend upon whether
"the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are
such as to merit the approval of all just men.' 4 The ABA Section of
Legal Education describes "ethical conduct and integrity"' 5 as an
"[e]ssential characteristic of the professional lawyer.' 6 ABA President
Jerome Shestack proclaims "fidelity to ethics and integrity as a
meaningful commitment-in the spirit of enlarging and enhancing the
practice, and awareness of, ethics" as first among "the elements of
professionalism.
'' 7
Beyond their inspirational value, these proclamations acknowledge
that high ethical standards are essential to professionalism and
lawyers' exclusive privilege to practice law.' 8 Lawyers' privilege rests
on a bargain between society and the legal profession. Society permits
lawyers to regulate themselves in exchange for the profession's
guaranty that lawyers will be ethical, competent, and place the public's
interest above their own self-interest.' 9 If lawyers do not meet these
1 1. See infra Part IV.
12. The conduct of lawyers is a different matter. See infra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
13. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1981).
14. A.B.A., 1908 FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP., REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ABA,
at 575 (1908) (quoting the CANON OF ETHICS pmbl.).
15. TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 7.
16. Id. at6.
17. Jerome J. Shestack, Defining Our Calling, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 8, 8.
18. While professionalism requires lawyers to meet high moral standards, it is not the
only source for such an expectation. Even commentators who reject professionalism
hold lawyers to strict standards. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 6, at 1276 (arguing that
the moral conduct of lawyers will improve if lawyers replace professionalism with a
business paradigm); Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument,
26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 403-04 (discussing the connection in the legal profession
between serving commercial interests and serving the common good).
19. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 1239-40.
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high ethical standards, the rationale for self-regulation and the laws
prohibiting unauthorized practice fails.
B. Academic Disregard for Legal Ethics
Standing in marked contrast to the legal profession's commitment to
legal ethics is the law schools' disdain for teaching legal ethics.
Professor Deborah Rhode observes that "[t]hroughout the twentieth
century, a wide gap has persisted between the bar's official
pronouncements and educational practices concerning professional
responsibility." '2 She notes that during:
the early twentieth century, such instruction remained quite
minimal, usually consisting of lecture series by judges or
prominent attorneys. For many of these series, no credit and no
grade were given; sometimes, as it turned out, neither were the
lectures. Those that did occur were generally short on content
and long on platitudes: 'general piffle' was the description
offered by one of the first serious scholars in the field.2'
In the 1950's, leaders of the Association of American Law Schools
recommended that law schools offer both ethics courses and pervasive
teaching of ethics throughout the curriculum. 22 At the same time, the
reality of law school teaching contradicted this aspiration. A survey
revealed that most ethics courses "consisted of only one hour of
ungraded instruction each week" and that very few, if any, non-ethics
courses included pervasive ethics instruction. 23
The modern era of teaching legal ethics began in 1974.24 The
notorious conduct of lawyers implicated in the Watergate scandal
undermined "public confidence in the legal profession." 25 In order to
20. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 37
(1992).
21. Id. at 35.
22. See id. at 37; see also MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 15-
16 (1980); cf JULIUS STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 245-46
(1959) (describing the Association of American Law School's discussion of the
pervasive method of ethics teaching).
23. Rhode, supra note 20, at 36; see also KELLY, supra note 22, at 15; James E. Starrs,
Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont Via the Pervasive System, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365,
379 (1965).
24. Use of this date to demarcate the modem era of teaching is not intended to suggest
that there were not outstanding ethics teachers and scholars prior to that time.
25. Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A
Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247, 248; see also Mary C. Daly et al.,
Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 193-94. Rhode explained that "the
development of clinical programs, public interest law, consumer consciousness, and
activist student bodies encouraged challenges to traditional professional roles and
722 [Vol. 29
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restore public confidence and bolster the integrity of lawyers, the ABA
House of Delegates "mandat[ed] the teaching of professional
responsibility in all ABA-accredited law schools. 2 6 A late 1970s
Doonesbury cartoon summarized law schools' response to this
requirement. Discussing whether a legal ethics course would make a
difference, a law student responds "nah-all that ethics stuff is just
more Watergate fallout! Trendy lip service to our better selves." '27
Law schools resented the "ABA's assertion of curricular authority."
Although these schools may have complied with the letter of the ABA
requirement,29 the course offerings were largely "second class."3
Law students got the message. A 1975-76 American Bar
Foundation ("ABF") study found that law students "perceived
[professional responsibility courses] as "requiring less time, as
substantially easier, as less well taught, and as a less valuable use of
class time."31 The courses had "a low status in the latent curriculum
hierarchy, 32 because they were more likely to be taught by the
discussion method rather than the socratic method33 and were less
intellectually challenging due to the lack of doctrinal complexity.34
Ronald Pipkin, author of the ABF study, concluded "that the
prevailing mode of [professional responsibility] instruction in fact
socializes students into the belief that legal ethics are not important."
35
Since the undertaking of the Pipkin study, however, significant
change has occurred.36 As observed by Roger Cramton and Susan
regulatory structures." Rhode, supra note 20, at 39. However, the Watergate scandal
provided "the primary impetus for ethics instructions." Id.
26. Daly, et ai., supra note 25, at 194. The ABA House of Delegates added Standard
302(a)(iii) providing that each "law school ... shall provide and require for all student
candidates for a professional degree, instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the
legal profession." A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 302(a)(iii)
(1977); see also Pipkin, supra note 25, at 248. This appears to be the first time the ABA
required law schools to offer a "specific course." Id. at 249.
27. GARRY B. TRUDEAU, DOONESBURY (1975), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (5th
ed. 1990); see also Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment
in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 145 (1996) (quoting
dialogue from Doonesbury comic strip).
28. Daly et al., supra note 25, at 195.
29. Pipkin, supra note 25, at 249.
30. Daly et al., supra note 25, at 195.
3 1. Pipkin, supra note 25, at 258.
32. Id. at 257.
33. Id. at 259.
34. Id. at 263-64.
35. Id. at 274 [italics in original].
36. One recent catalyst for change was the W.M. Keck Foundation's Law and Legal
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Koniak, "the volume and complexity of case law dealing with the
responsibilities of lawyers has exploded; new and more challenging
textbooks have been published on the subject; and the subject we refer
to as 'the law and ethics of lawyering' has become a half-way
respectable field of academic scholarship."37 Deborah Rhode has
provided an excellent text for making pervasive ethics a reality.38
Further, schools like Fordham University have developed advanced
and contextual ethics courses,39 and a number of commentators have
offered proposals for innovations in teaching ethics.' Teaching ethics
in a clinical setting has received more focus, 41 and some schools have
included ethics as a first year course.42
Unfortunately, these developments are not representative of the
current state of legal ethics teaching. Cramton and Koniak note that
today, "legal ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal education."43
Echoing the views of a number of commentators, they find that "[i]n
most law schools today legal ethics occupies a minor academic role as
a one- or two-credit required course in the upper-class years, often
taught by adjuncts or by a rotating group of faculty conscripts." 4
Administration Grant Program that, from 1991 to 1995, provided almost $5 million in
grants to a number of law schools to improve the teaching of legal ethics. See Thomas
B. Metzloff & David B. Wilkins, Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn
1995, at 1, 1.
37. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 146.
38. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD (1994); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Richard H. Sander, The 'Infusion'
Method at UCLA: Teaching Ethics Pervasively, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-
Autumn 1995, at 129, 129.
39. See Daly et al, supra note 25, at 199-211; see also Bruce A. Green, Less is More:
Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 372-77 (1998).
40. See, e.g., James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and
Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71 (1996); Christine Mary
Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility-An Alternative Approach to Teaching
Legal Ethics, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 287.
41. See, e.g., David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching
in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 64 (1995); Michael E. Wolfson, Professional
Responsibility as a Lawyering Skill, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995,
at 297, 297.
42. See TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 40-41.
43. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 146. Not surprisingly, Susan P. Koniak and
Geoffrey C. Hazard similarly use a family analogy to describe the status of legal ethics.
See Susan P. Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 117, 117 ("[L]egal ethics remains the step-
child of legal education.").
44. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 147; see also TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 40-41 (reporting a 1994 survey finding that 44% of
schools offer a required two credit course, with 6% requiring no course at all, 23%
requiring a three credit course, and the remainder having a variety of approaches,
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They further observe that most schools which claim to teach ethics
pervasively in fact offer "little more than tokenism designed to satisfy
the [ABA] accreditation requirement. ' ' 5 While legal ethics scholarship
has advanced "half-way" to respectability, Koniak and Hazard note
that "' [s]erious scholarship' in legal ethics is still considered somewhat
of an oxymoron.''6  In addition, students continue to share the
faculty's low opinion of legal ethics. One observer notes that students
view legal ethics as "the dog of the law school [curriculum]-hard to
teach, disappointing to take, and often presented to vacant seats or
vacant minds."'47
III. WHY ACADEMICS WRONGFULLY DISDAIN LEGAL ETHICS
What explains the disjunction between the promise of professional
aspirations and the failure of the legal academy to honor these
aspirations? For years, many law professors have maintained that
legal ethics need not and cannot be taught. 8 This view is the product
including a one credit required course as well as more challenging options).
Professor Deborah Rhode recently conducted an informal survey of ethics teaching at
leading law schools. See Rhode, supra note 20, at 39-40, n.43 (noting that "slightly
over half" of the 92 schools reporting a mandatory ethics course to the AALS
Professional Responsibility Section offered a two credit course). In one school, she
discovered a "lecturer, known unaffectionately as 'old ether lips,' [who] gained students'
attention through multiple choice quizzes, in which much depended on getting the digits
of the ABA Code sections in the right sequence." Id. at 40. At a different school, "a
retired municipal court judge walked his class through the bar's disciplinary rules in
taxonomies of three. With the aid of a slide projector, students one day learned three
different kinds of conflicting interest; on the next, three reasons for zealous advocacy."
Id. Throughout these schools, most faculty asserted that "professional responsibility
coverage should not be their responsibility." Id. at 52.
A powerful testimonial to the second class status of legal ethics is the example of
Boalt Hall Law School, where proponents of legal ethics teaching felt they had to trade
placement of ethics in the first year curriculum for permission to increase the credit
hours of the course from two to three. See Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the
First Year: An Experiment, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 19,
20-22.
45. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 148.
46. Koniak & Hazard, supra note 43, at 117.
47. Rhode, supra note 20, at 40 (quoting Dale C. Moss, Out of Balance: Why Can't
Law Schools Teach Ethics?, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1991, at 18-19); see also Cramton &
Koniak, supra note 27, at 145 (noting that "[Ilaw students, law teachers and
practitioners often assume that legal ethics is mushy pap that the organized profession
requires law students to study for public relations purposes").
48. See generally Elliot E. Cheatham, What the Law Schools Can Do to Raise the
Standards of the Legal Profession, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 716, 716 (1933) (noting that
legal academics consider legal ethics "beneath our notice" or believe teaching legal
ethics "transcends our powers"); Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 146-47 ("Many
law school faculties remain convinced that [legal ethics] is unteachable or believe that it
is not worth teaching.").
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of three powerfully entrenched perspectives: (1) a faith in the ethical
guarantees of professionalism and the methods of legal education; (2)
the belief in the scientific basis of legal education; and (3) the
assumption that adults lack the capacity for ethical development.
While these three perspectives have an imposing pedigree, they have
little persuasive force.
A. The Belief that the Profession and Education Will Ensure that
Lawyers Act Ethically
Despite the diminishing faith of the general public, the faith of legal
academics endures based on the belief that venerated elements of
professional ideology make the teaching of legal ethics unnecessary.
These elements include the professionalism's assertion of lawyer's
essential goodness, the legal education's promise of character
building, and the legal community's self-policing function.49 If any of
these aspects functioned satisfactorily, law schools would not need to
teach legal ethicsi ° Unfortunately, they do not.
Professionalism maintains that lawyers will behave ethically. It
presumes that most lawyers act ethically. For these lawyers,
articulation of ethical standards in codes of conduct will suffice to
ensure ethical conduct.5 ' There are two further mechanisms that
purport to control those few practitioners who act unethically. The
first of these mechanisms is the "invisible hand" of reputation. 2
49. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
50. Similar arguments could of course also be made with regard to teaching legal
skills. See infra Part I1I.B.
5 1. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 1240; see also Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the
Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 259-262
(1992) [hereinafter Pearce, Republican Origins].
52. The "invisible hand of reputation" derived from the republican ideology, which
preceded professionalism. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
reprinted in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 75 (5th ed. 1907). Writing in 1854, Judge George
Sharswood, the father of our legal ethics codes, observed that "[s]ooner or later, the real
public-the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits, and are
valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of the Bar,
unless indeed there be some glaring defect of popular qualities." Id. at 75; see also
Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 51, at 260.
While acknowledging the need to create more formal mechanisms for regulating
lawyers, professionalism retained the "invisible hand" of reputation. For example,
Canon 27 of the ABA Canons of Ethics stated that "[t]he most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust." A.B.A., 1908 FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP., REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE ABA, at 575, 582 (1908) (quoting the ABA CANONS OF ETHICS Canon
27); see also Pearce, supra note 6, at 1242, 1238; Pearce, Republican Origins, supra
[Vol. 29726
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Lawyers who behave ethically earn the respect of their peers; this
respect determines whether they succeed in law practice. Conversely,
lawyers who behave unethically will not prosper. The second of these
mechanisms are the existing formal procedures for preventing
unethical people from gaining entrance to the bar and for disciplining
the few rotten apples who do become lawyers.53 With such
safeguards in place and with lawyers' success subject to the forces of
reputation, the profession guarantees its own virtue, rendering ethics
teaching in law school unnecessary.
The character building function of legal education serves as another
reason for refusing to make special efforts to teach ethics. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, for example, described how legal education imparts
moral lessons, both a passion for "profounder thought" and an
antipathy against "mean ideals and easy self-satisfaction."'  More
recently, Anthony Kronman praised the case method's "function[] as
an instrument for the development of moral imagination." 55 It causes
the student "to care with new intensity about the good of the legal
system and the community it represents."56 This faith in legal
instruction perhaps explains why many leaders of legal education
maintain that "coverage of ethical concerns will occur naturally and
pervasively throughout the curricula," even when their schools offer
little or no specific instruction in legal ethics. 7
note 51, at 271-72; cf Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (1989) (suggesting the existence of a base level invisible hand of
reputation in the bargaining process).
53. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 1245; Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 51, at
259-60.
54. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 474, 475-76 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
55. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 113 (1993).
56. Id. at 119; see also Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 178 ("The case method
also cultivates perceptual habits and may be used to cultivate a public-spirited approach
to law and legal institutions-what Brandeis referred to as 'the opportunity in the law' to
lead an admirable life.").
57. See Rhode, supra note 20, at 31. Cramton and Koniak express skepticism for a
few high prestige law schools which make such a claim. See Cramton & Koniak, supra
note 27, at 147. Similarly, studies in the 1950s reported that despite claims of
pervasive ethics teaching, only 36 of the thousands of non-ethics courses taught at the
85 law schools across the country discussed ethics. See Rhode, supra note 20, at 36.
Recently, Deborah Rhode undertook a related survey to determine whether casebooks
outside the area of ethics included content relating to ethical issues. She found that in
"138 books in fourteen subject areas the median amount of coverage in each volume was
1.4% of the total pages." Id. at 41.
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Unfortunately, evidence today strongly suggests that neither the
promises of professionalism, nor the character building function of
legal education, satisfactorily ensure lawyers' ethical conduct. In fact,
the overwhelming consensus is that lawyers' ethics are declining, both
in compliance with ethical codes and in commitment to the public
good.58 At the same time, the profession has been unable to police
itself adequately because its disciplinary system is underfinanced and
ineffective.5 9 Whatever merit and faith in professionalism and legal
education once existed, such merit and faith no longer offers credible
support for academia's position that teaching legal ethics is not
essential. Indeed, the mounting evidence of unethical lawyer conduct
continues to prompt demands for improved ethics teaching by law
schools."6
B. The Mistaken Notion that Ethics and the Science of Law Do Not
Mix
The belief that legal training builds character coexists with the
somewhat contradictory notion that legal education is a science to
which ethics is simply irrelevant. Related to this notion are the views
that ethics teaching consists solely of inappropriate proselytizing and
that its doctrine is too simple to merit serious consideration. 6'
The model of legal education in today's classrooms, the case
method, grew out of Harvard Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's
view of law as a science.62 Langdell described appellate cases as the
58. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 1257 (noting the claims that "lawyers, their ethics,
and their professionalism are 'lost,' 'betrayed,' in 'decline,' in 'crisis,' facing 'demise,'
near 'death,' and in need of 'redemption,"' as a result of commercialism) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
59. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
893-97 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining why the professional disciplinary system needs
significant improving).
60. See, e.g., TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 13-25;
Thomas B. Metzloff & David B. Wilkins, Forward to Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 1 (noting the importance of legal ethics
education in law schools at a time when lawyers are plagued with "self-doubts about the
nature of [their] profession").
61. See Rhode, supra note 20, at 48-49; Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 148.
Critics are concerned that "[mioral instruction will amount to moral indoctrination."
Rhode, supra note 20, at 49.
62. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s
TO THE 1980s 52 (1983). These developments in law reflected trends in higher education
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which moved from a classic liberal
education to a more practical curriculum informed by the "scientific spirit." See id. at
51-52. This led higher education institutions generally to move moral education from
its central place in the curriculum to the periphery. See Rhode, supra note 20, at 33-34.
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raw materials from which to distill the principles of law.' He believed
that law libraries are to law professors and students as "laboratories
... are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history
to the zoologists, [and] the botanical garden to the botanists."
Felix Cohen suggests that this scientific approach made legal
academics hostile to teaching ethics.65 A science emphasizes "facts,"
not "moral values," and those who seek to promote the science of law
believe "that law can attain the prestige of science only by showing a
thorough contempt for judgments of value."'  After all, notes Cohen,
"[t]here is no room for ethics in the oldest and most advanced science,
physics. Why should those who seek to build legal science concern
themselves with ethics?"6 7
Although few law faculty today expressly identify themselves as
legal scientists, Langdell's idealization of science continues to
profoundly influence legal academia.68 While those faculty who
identify themselves with a scientific perspective are more likely to
draw upon a social science, such as economics, than a hard science,
such as physics, 69 these faculty still distinguish between facts and
values.70 Legal positivists, who focus on what law is, similarly
63. See STEVENS, supra note 62, at 52. Langdell believed that,
law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to apply them with constant facility and
certainty ... is what constitutes a true lawyer . . . and the shortest and best, if
not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases
in which it is embodied ....
Id. (quoting Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, vii) (ellipses in
original).
64. Id. at 53.
65. See FELIX S. COHEN, Modern Ethics and the Law, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE:
SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 17, 19 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1970). In fact, in
the early 1900s, prior emphasis on teaching morals and ethics in higher education
"gradually gave way to emphasis on specialized training and ostensibly value-free
inquiry." Rhode, supra note 20, at 34.
66. COHEN, supra note 65, at 19.
67. Id.
68. See KRONMAN, supra note 55, at 110 ( "The single most prominent feature of
twentieth-century American legal education is its heavy reliance on the so-called case
method of instruction.").
69. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 87-88 (1977) ("Where
Langdell had talked of chemistry, physics, zoology, and botany as disciplines allied to
the law, the Realists talked of economics and sociology not merely as allied disciplines
but as disciplines which were in some sense part and parcel of the law."). Kronman
refers to the law-and-economics movement in law schools as "the most powerful current
in American law teaching today." KRONMAN, supra note 55, at 226.
70. See KRONMAN, supra note 55, at 226.
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separate law from morality.7' Even many faculty who accept that the
study of law implicates evaluative decisions do not teach about values.
They commonly apply an "instrumentalist" approach that assumes that
certain policy goals are worthy of pursuit, and then focuses students
entirely on whether the law "provides an appropriate means for the
realization of [those] policy goals."72
In short, whether through old-fashioned Langdellian science,
through cutting edge Law and Economics, or through policy-based
instrumentalism, law professors continue to separate ethical questions
from legal questions. Consequently, teachers' and students' values
appear to become irrelevant. Some faculty view legal ethics as
"somehow uninteresting or unworthy of fine minds. 7 3 Others assert
"that moral instruction will amount to moral indoctrination." 74 As a
result, legal ethics education improperly "becomes an occasion for
teachers to impose their values and to penalize students with different
perspectives. ' ' 75 As David Wilkins recounts, "students who raise
general ethical objections in traditional law school courses are often
told that these concerns are irrelevant to the 'legal' issues being
discussed., 76
7 1. See, e.g., H. L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 593-95 (1958); Norton, supra note 52, at 459 (suggesting that law
teachers and students must "dispel a confusion between morality and law" in order to
properly master the law).
72. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L. REV. 1679, 1692 (1997)
(describing instrumentalism).
73. KELLY, supra note 22, at 25. A similar dynamic exists with regard to training in
legal skills. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 9, at 62-66 (arguing that law schools employ
too many "impractical" professors who pay far too little attention to training lawyers
to practice law). The move from apprenticeship to law schools as the predominant
method for training lawyers rested on the notion that the practical training of
apprenticeship was uneven and inadequate preparation for lawyers. See, e.g., STEVENS,
supra note 62, at 23-24. The scientific approach to lawyering provided the rationale
both for minimizing the role of apprenticeship and for "'combattling']" the inclination
of law students "to be practical." Id. at 93.
74. Rhode, supra note 20, at 48. Legal education should be a "rational hard-headed,
and no-nonsense analysis of ... controversial problems," not a "camp meeting or
spiritual retreat." Id. at 49 (quoting James F. Bresnahan, "Ethics" and the Study and
Practice of Law: The Problems of Being a Professional in a Fuller Sense, 28 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 189, 194 (1976)).
75. Rhode, supra note 20, at 48-49.
76. David B. Wilkins, Redefining the "Professional" in Professional Ethics: An
Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching Professionalism, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer-Autumn 1995, at 241, 246; cf. William Stringfellow, A Lawyer's Work, in
WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW, A KEEPER OF THE WORD 30, 32 (Bill Wylie Kellerman ed., 1994)
(describing Stringfellow's experience at Harvard Law School in the 1950s where
mention of the word justice "evoked ridicule, as if justice were a subject below the
sophistication of lawyers").
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Although these critiques persist, the ideological perspectives from
which they derive their force have become an anachronism. The
complexity of the law and ethics of lawyering has become
undeniable. 77 Moral reasoning has regained respect as a serious
academic subject.78 The idea that law is a science has lost some of its
hegemony, 79 as has the distinction between facts and values. 80 Within
the academic community more broadly, the notion that science is a
timeless and privileged means of discovery has become regarded as
philosophically suspect.8
Within the scientific community, the notion that science and ethics
do not mix has also lost its dominant influence. A recent National
Academy of Science publication on "responsible conduct in research"
discusses the ethics of "experimental techniques," the analysis of data,
and "conflicts of interest,"'82 as well as "the impact [of research] on
society. ' The publication notes that "[c]onstruction of the atomic
bomb and the development of recombinant DNA-events that grew
out of basic research on the nucleus of the atom and investigations of
certain bacterial enzymes, respectively-are two examples of how
seemingly arcane areas of science can have tremendous societal
consequences."'" Accordingly, today little support exists for the
77. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 159.
78. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, Puncturing the Myth of the Moral Intractability
of Law Students: The Suggestiveness of the Work of Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg
for Ethical Training in Legal Education, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 223
(1993) (suggesting that there is "an objective and universal dimension to moral
structures and moral reasoning" that "teaching can promote and accelerate").
79. See, e.g., Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save this Postmodern Court: The Death of
Necessity and the Transformation of the Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1995) (observing that "Langdell's ideal of law as a science of
reason has broken down generally within the law"); David Kairys, Introduction to THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 5 (David Kairys ed., revised ed. 1990)
(criticizing "the notion of law as neutral, objective, and quasi-scientific").
80. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 127-149 (1981) (arguing
that the fact/value distinction is untenable within contemporary metaphysics,
epistemology, and philosophy of language).
81. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1 (2d ed.
1970) (suggesting that scientific knowledge is socially constructed).
82. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, ON BEING A
SCIENTIST: RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT IN RESEARCH (1995) (joint publication of National
Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine).
83. Id. at 20.
84. Id.; see also Freeman Dyson, Can Science Be Ethical?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, April
10, 1997, at 46 (discussing the ethics of science and research in the 20th century); David
J. Mattson, Ethics and Science in Natural Resource Agencies, 46 BIOSCIENCE 767 (1996)
(describing the ethical dilemmas faced by natural resource agency scientists, and the
features of agencies that can exacerbate the already difficult practice of mission-oriented
science).
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proposition that "contempt" for ethics is necessary in order for "law
[to] attain the prestige of science. ' 8
C. The Belief that Legal Ethics Cannot Make Law Students More
Ethical
Many law faculty believe that law schools cannot improve the moral
conduct of students through the teaching of legal ethics.86 They assert
that students' values have been fully formed prior to law school and
are not likely to change.87 This view, that the ethical capacity of adults
is relatively static, appears to be a survival of the feudal concept of
status wherein one's character and place in society was dictated by
birth and family status.' If birth and family circumstances dictate
character, education in ethics can make little or no difference.
This view reflects two major manifestations. The first is the
historical proposition that legal education and admission to practice
should be limited to the "right kind of people." As one critic of
required legal ethics education stated in 1930, the "'right kind' of law
student already knows what constitutes moral and ethical conduct, and
... a formal course in Legal Ethics will not supply the proper sort of
character training for students who are not the 'right kind.' ' 89 Henry
Drinker, perhaps the most prominent legal ethicist of the mid-twentieth
century, reflected this view when he observed that "Russian Jew
boys" were disproportionately "guilty of professional abuses" because
their family background and education did not inculcate them in
85. COHEN, supra note 65, at 19.
86. See, e.g., Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 146-47 ("Many law school
faculties remain convinced that [legal ethics] is unteachable .... "). In the 1920's, for
example, leading law schools refused to teach an ethics course on the ground that "it is a
fallacy to assume that high ethical standards can be inculcated either by general
exhortations or by case method drill in legal etiquette." ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED,
PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 255 n.3 (photo. reprint
1987) (1928).
87. See infra notes 93-96. See also Rhode, supra note 20, at 36; see also Pipkin,
supra note 25, at 265.
88. For example, in his classic observation, Sir Henry Maine described the move
"from Status to Contract" as a move from a "society in which all the relations of Persons
are summed up in the relations of Family... towards a phase of social order in which all
these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals." HENRY J. S. MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 99-100 (Ernest Rhys 1927); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 292 (1989) (describing the premodern notion "that
family and marriage were the essential determinants of an individual's economic security
and social standing").
89. Charles H. Kinnane, Compulsory Study of Professional Ethics by Law Students,
16 A.B.A. J. 222, 222 (1930) (delineating opposing views on the topic of required
ethics courses).
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American ideals.'
The second manifestation of this view, common in legal academia
today, incorporates Drinker's view that family and environmental
influences prior to law school determine law students' and lawyers'
ethics. 9' Rather than associate unethical conduct with particular
groups,92 it relies on the notion that a person's capacity for moral
development maximizes once a person reaches adulthood. 93
By their own terms, these perspectives are unpersuasive. Even if a
student's moral development was generally complete before law
school, that student would still have to apply this moral framework to
the pursuit of law. John Mixon and Robert Schuwerk observe that
"while law students have well-formed personal values stemming from
family, church, and society, they nonetheless have relatively
unsophisticated and unformed ideas of what it means to be a 'good
lawyer.""
Research demonstrating that values are malleable in adulthood
renders these perspectives even less persuasive. Psychologists have
shown that adulthood, like childhood, is a time of personal growth and
90. STEVENS, supra note 62, at 184 n.41 (citing 1929 A.B.A. PRoc. 622-23). Drinker
contrasted foreign born Jews with "many splendid Jewish lawyers and judges" he knew
who were born in the United States. Id. Drinker's point was that the requirement of a
college education for admission to law school served as a proxy for identifying persons
of the right class and right values. See id. at 176. During the twentieth century, bar
leaders sought to raise the prerequisites for law school education in order to limit or
abolish the proprietary, often night law schools that admitted large numbers of poor and
immigrant students, many of whom lacked high school educations. See id. at 99-101.
As one bar leader observed, "[ylou can produce a moral and intelligent bar, by raising the
standard, not only of education, but along economic lines so that every Tom, Dick and
Harry cannot come to the Bar." id. at 100 (quoting Franklin Danaher, 3 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 35 (1911)).
91. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 20, at 31 (describing this perspective, Rhode
explains, "Other educator's conclude that postgraduate courses in ethics offer too little,
too late: childhood socialization, situational pressures, and practice norms can hardly be
offset through occasional sermonizing by academics.").
92. While negative stereotypes similar to Drinker's are not so commonly expressed
today, they are not entirely absent from the academy. See Verhovek, Sam Howe, Texas
Law Professor Prompts a Furor Over Race Comments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at
A28 (reporting that law professor Lino Graglia stated that "black and Mexican-American
students were 'not academically competitive' with white students at the nation's top
universities").
93. See, e.g., Pipkin, supra note 25, at 266-67 (Pipkin states, "Proponents of this
view believe that moral character is malleable only at an early age and that the value
systems which underpin ethical judgments (or explain the lack of them) are so deep-
seated in adults as to be immutable.").
94. John Mixon & Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional
Responsibility, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 87, 98 (applying
insights from Andrew S. Watson, A Psychiatrist on the Law School Faculty: Influences
on Professional Careers, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 240 (1988)).
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development. 95  Not surprisingly, studies reveal that moral
development continues "after the age of 1 8."96 As the Committee on
Professionalism of the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions concluded, "[tihe once widely held view that ethical
precepts are fully formed before law school has been proven to be
untrue." 97
Research further confirms that law school in particular is a time
when students' values change. For example, political scientist Robert
Stover documented the law school experience and its effect on students
as making them less altruistic and less willing to work in a public
interest job.98 Further underscoring the dramatic impact of a law
school on a law student's personal development is an American Bar
Foundation study reporting that law students' rate of significant mental
health problems begins at an average rate but rises to as much as four
times the average by graduation." Other studies support the specific
proposition that ethics can be taught. Deborah Rhode notes that
"[m]ore than a hundred studies evaluating moral education courses
find that well-designed curricula can significantly improve capacities of
moral reasoning. . ..",0
The literature on legal ethics education, however, is less definitive.
Some commentators have found ethics education to be significant,
95. See, e.g., GAIL SHEEHY, PASSAGES (1974) (discussing research that illustrates
adulthood as a time of personal growth).
96. Mordecai Nisan & Lawrence Kohlberg, Universality and Variation in Moral
Judgment: A Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Study in Turkey, 53 CHILD DEV. 865, 869
(1982).
97. TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 22. The Committee
explained, "[jiudgement is an essential element of lawyering; and the failure to
emphasize its importance in the classroom sends out the negative image that it is
unimportant." Id.
98. See ROBERT STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST
COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL 34-35 (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989) (claiming that
"during law school the number of ... students who preferred that their first job be in
public interest law declined markedly, and this shift can be explained in terms of
changes in the students' values and expectations"); see also RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG,
BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1992) (providing an account
of a Harvard law student's experience); Robert A. Solomon, Teaching Morality, 40
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 507 (1992) (advocating the establishment of more legal clinics at
law schools).
99. See G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
225, 236 (1986). The researchers explained that, "professional schools are highly
invasive institutions which exert intense control by purposely influencing beliefs,
values, and personality characteristics of students." Id. at 251-52.
100. Rhode, supra note 20, at 46-47. However, she notes that, "[tlhe extent to which
enhanced capacities for ethical analysis affect ethical conduct is more difficult to
assess." Id. at 47.
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while others have not.'0 ' Despite these mixed findings, Deborah
Rhode observes that "[t]here is ... more evidence on the effectiveness
of professional responsibility instruction than there is on the
effectiveness of most professional education.""
Consequently, the contention that adults do not develop morally is a
weak justification for resistance to teaching legal ethics, as is the faith
in existing professional structures and the belief that law is purely a
science." Whatever authority these three views once had, they
possess little viability today. It is now time for law faculties to
consider teaching ethics seriously.
IV. TEACHING ETHICS SERIOUSLY
A new ethics curriculum must be designed which places legal ethics
at the center of the law school curriculum, free of the misconceptions
of the past and faithful to a commitment to developing ethical
practitioners. At a minimum, legal ethics education must include a
required first year, first semester course of at least three credits, a
required advanced course of at least three credits, and pervasive
teaching throughout the curriculum."°
The central role of legal ethics in the curriculum is warranted by its
status as the single most important subject in law school.'0 5 Legal
ethics is the only subject taught in law school which every student will
101. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of
the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 351-57
(1982) (discussing results of various studies which lend support to both sides of the
ethics education issue).
102. Rhode, supra note 20, at 48. She adds that "the evidence we do have suggests
that mainstream courses do a relatively poor job in preparing professionals for the
skills that are most crucial in practice." Id.
103. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text discussing studies indicating that
adulthood is a time of personal growth and development, and supra notes 78-86 and
accompanying text discussing the problems with the belief that law is purely a science.
104. This suggestion is similar to proposals of Cramton, Koniak, and Rhode. See
Rhode, supra note 20, at 54 (recommending "a required introduction to professional
responsibility issues in the first year, an upper-level course that gives them central
treatment, and efforts at integration in other core courses and in special supplemental
events... "). Where it differs is in making the first year course the equivalent of other
first year required courses and in making the required upper class course a contextual
ethics course. At least one law school, Notre Dame, requires two ethics courses,
including a first year course. See David T. Link, The Pervasive Method of Teaching
Ethics, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1989) (discussing the curriculum at Notre Dame Law
School), see also Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty
Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367, 393 (proposing a required first year
professionalism course). Another teaches two years of legal ethics and professionalism
for skills. See Molitemo, supra note 40, at 106.
105. See text accompanying notes 10-11.
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encounter in practice, regardless of their specialty. It establishes the
foundation for the vital decisions that students will have to make
regarding how they will live their lives as lawyers. These decisions,
in turn, will shape how the public perceives lawyers and the legal
system. Within law school, legal ethics connects the entire
curriculum. Just as legal ethics issues arise in every class, the teaching
of legal ethics includes a broad range of topics drawn from other
subjects.
A required first year, first semester, legal ethics course is essential
for the implementation of a central role of legal ethics in the law school
curriculum 1° because the first year courses signal what it means to
think and act like a lawyer.'0 7 As Howard Lesnick noted, "it is what is
imprinted in that initial immersion [in the first semester of the first
year], and not any broader message of the three years, that shapes
students' consciousness of what is important and not important to
being a lawyer."'" Equally important, the first year provides students
with the requisite tools to understand what the law means. Ethical
instruction from the start of law school is necessary in order to provide
students with an ethical framework to evaluate and question the ethical
implications of what they learn in other classes. 1' 9
Just as important as the placement of this course in the first semester
of the first year is the requirement of three or more credits. The
designation of credit hours serves both a symbolic and functional
106. In a recent survey of 131 law schools, researchers found that just five schools
offered a two-to-four credit ethics course in the first year, and only another three schools
offered lawyering courses with significant ethics and professionalism components. See
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 40. Eight other schools
offered one credit first year courses, while three more claimed they included legal ethics
in substantive law courses. See id. at 40-41.
107. See, e.g., Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
57, 57 (1992) ("[N]early everyone agrees-in an 'indefinable chant whose repetition
suggests sacred meaning'-that the purpose of law school is to teach every student to
'think like a lawyer."').
108. Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering as
Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 1157, 1159 (1990); see also Elizabeth D. Gee & James R. Elkins, Resistance to
Legal Ethics, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 29, 34 (1987) (advocating psychological grounds for
"[t]eaching of legal ethics in the first year" because "[t]he first year is a socialization
period in which a student's ethical sensitivity and commitment are subject to
influence"); Rhode, supra note 20, at 51 (commenting that if legal ethics teaching only
occurs after the first year, "many students will be too cynical or preoccupied to give it
full attention").
109. Rhode, supra note 20, at 51. Rhode notes that absent first year instruction,
students "will also have lacked the background to raise relevant issues in the other
classes." Id.
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purpose. While three credits is not sufficient to provide mastery,"10 it
does afford a reasonable introduction. In contrast, offering less than
three credits sends a message that legal ethics is less important than
other first year courses. Teaching legal ethics seriously requires that
students understand that legal ethics is the most important course.11
Sending that message also mandates requiring an upper-class
advanced class in ethics of at least three credits. The combination of
requiring a first year class and an advanced class would place legal
ethics in a unique position of importance in most schools. In addition
to affording another opportunity to address basic issues which the first
year course cannot cover, the upper-class offering would provide
students with lessons which will be more effective once they have
gained a greater command of substantive law and some experience in
legal work. ' 2 To prepare the students for the issues they will address
in practice and to engage them in the material, the advanced courses
should be contextually grounded in practice areas, such as business
transactions, criminal advocacy, or public interest law. 13
Making legal ethics the most important subject also requires the
pervasive teaching of legal ethics. Pervasive teaching is essential for
both symbolic and substantive purposes. It offers the opportunity to
address issues not covered in the required ethics courses and teaches
students the skills needed to identify and analyze issues in settings
where ethics is not the primary focus of attention. Absent pervasive
110. See TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 44-45; see also
Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 166 ("Allocating only one or two credit-hours
makes it difficult or impossible to do the subject matter justice.").
I 11. One of the designers of a two-credit first year course in legal ethics at the
University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall) conceded that "[b]y
keeping the course at two units, when other first-year courses were taught in three-, four-
, or five-unit blocks, we made it clear that Legal Profession was, in our view, the least
important of those courses." McG. Bundy, supra note 44, at 30.
112. Arguments against teaching legal ethics in the first year often rely on the
necessity of work experience and substantive knowledge to learning legal ethics. See,
e.g., Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 165-66 ("[A] sophisticated discussion of
some ethics issues requires substantive knowledge of legal concepts not ordinarily
taught in the first year."); Rhode, supra note 20, at 51 ("If the course occurs in the first
year of training, many students will not yet know enough to grasp the full dimensions of
professional dilemmas.").
In light of the traditional perception of legal ethics as doctrinally simplistic, these
arguments are somewhat ironic. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Moreover,
basic coverage of the rules and cases, professional role, and moral reasoning does not
necessarily demand any more special knowledge and experience than other first year
courses. Drafting a contract would certainly add to a student's understanding of contracts
class, and actually assisting in litigating a case would certainly enrich a student's study
of civil procedure, but most schools do not require such prerequisites.
113. See, e.g., Daly, et al., supra note 25, at 200.
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teaching, the law school sends a message that the "ethical dimensions"
of legal education and law practice are marginal." 4
While this pervasive approach completes the proposal for teaching
ethics seriously, a number of pedagogical and political challenges
remain. The proposal leaves unanswered the question of which
teaching method is most effective." 5 Further, it provides no roadmap
to ensure that faculty will make the commitment necessary to sustain a
viable, pervasive teaching program" 6 or for navigating politics with
regard to the allocation of resources and credit hours."11
The proposal does, however, offer a possible solution to Pipkin's
curricular paradox." 8 While acknowledging that meaningful ethics
education requires attention to the moral development of students,
Pipkin asserts that this attention clashes with the socialization students
have received at law school, which consequently devalues ethical
courses." 9 The proposal for teaching ethics, however, changes the
socialization of law students by making legal ethics the most important
subject. This shift should change how students perceive the methods
and content of their legal ethics lessons.
114. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal
Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 5-9 (1990); see generally Rhode, supra note 20.
115. The Cramton & Koniak proposal suggests, at a minimum, a required first-year,
first-semester course of at least three credits, a required advance course of three credits,
and pervasive teaching throughout curriculum. The Moliterno proposal requires two
years of legal ethics and professionalism skills courses to be taught. Compare
Moliterno, supra note 40, with Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27.
116. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 168 ("The pervasive approach... will
not succeed unless the faculty as a whole commits to it and institutional monitoring
ensures that individual faculty members take their responsibility seriously."); Rhode,
supra note 20, at 52 (providing that without adequate commitment, pervasive teaching
becomes a digression). Fortunately, the availability of Deborah Rhode's excellent text
on teaching ethics pervasively will make this project much easier to facilitate. See
Rhode, supra note 20.
117. See, e.g., TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at 15
(explaining that "[Ilaw school curriculum reform is a tedious and often frustrating task
and seems to work best when modest changes are made at the margin by adding one or
two additional courses") (footnotes omitted); Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at 165
(adding that "competition for hours in [the first] year poses a severe obstacle to the
introduction of any new course"); Gee & Elkins, supra note 108, at 34-48 (discussing
"barriers to change" in increasing attention to ethics in law school curriculum).
118. Pipkin, supra note 25, at 250-53, 272-75.
119. Id. Pipkin points out that "54 percent of [students] enrolled in courses on
professional responsibility indicated that other students were 'not very' or 'not at all'
concerned [with professional ethics], in contrast to the 94 percent of students
"concerned about making money." Id. at 274.
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V. CONCLUSION
This essay's proposal for teaching ethics seriously will certainly
send a message that law schools should consider ethical education to
be a high priority. But will it actually make a difference in the ethical
conduct of graduates? Although research suggests it will, 20 we will
not know for sure unless we try. Derek Bok made a similar point with
regard to the introduction of ethics courses. He asked, "Will
[students] behave more ethically? We may never know. But surely
the experiment is worth trying, for the goal has never been more
important to the quality of the society in which we live."''
Whatever uncertainty arises from teaching ethics seriously, we can
be certain of the consequences of failing to do so. Given the current
weakness of the traditional justifications for disdaining the teaching of
legal ethics and the perception that lawyers' ethics are in decline, law
schools that refuse to make legal ethics the most important subject are
sending a powerful message. To paraphrase Ronald Dworkin once
again, if the law schools do not teach legal ethics seriously, then they
do not take the conduct and reputation of lawyers seriously either.'2
120. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing whether education can
promote ethical conduct).
121. Derek C. Bok, Can Ethics Be Taught?, CHANGE, Oct. 1976, at 26, 30; see
Rhode, supra note 20, at 43 (quoting Derek C. Bok, Can Ethics Be Taught?, CHANGE,
Oct. 1976, at 26, 30).
122. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 205; see also Cramton & Koniak, supra note 27, at
157 (arguing that if law schools do not begin to teach ethics seriously, they should stop
"lying" about the importance of legal ethics to the legal profession and the legal
academy).
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